Abstract: We give a survey of different techniques for hiding data in several protocols from the TCP/IP protocol stack.
Introduction
An overt channel is a communication channel within a computer system or network, designed for the authorized transfer of data. A covert channel (first introduced by Lampson [1] ), on the other hand, is any communication channel that can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the systems security policy [2] . Any shared resource can potentially be used as a covert channel. Covert channels can be divided primarily in storage and timing channels. In the case of storage channels, usually one process writes (directly or indirectly) to a shared resource, while another process reads from it. Timing channels are essentially any techniques that convey information by the timing of events, in which case the receiving process needs a clock. Special timing covert channels are counting channels when they carry data by counting the occurrences of certain events [3] . Additionally, timing channels can be active if they generate additional traffic or passive if they manipulate the timing of existing traffic. As any other communication channel, a covert channel can be noisy or noiseless. According to the number of information flows between the sender and the receiver -several or one, there are aggregated and non-aggregated covert channels [4] . According to the presence or absence of the intermediate node in the communication, covert channels can be indirect or direct. Payload tunnel is a covert channel, where one protocol is tunnelled in the payload of the other protocol. Covert channels are studied within the steganography field, and different steganographic methods used in telecommunication networks are known as network steganography. different protocols or timing features) are modulated, so the message can be mapped first in the sorted vector, and then in the selected features.
Steganography in the Internet layer
Internet Protocol (IP) is the primary protocol in the TCP/IP protocol stack, that operates in the Internet layer. IP encapsulates obtained segments from Transport layer in packets with IP header, and delivers them from a given source to a given destination using IP addresses. It enables internetworking, offering connectionless datagram service. IP comes in two versions -version 4 (IPv4) and version 6 (IPv6). Table 1 , 2 and 3 summarize the covert channels in the Internet Protocol, together with their advantages, disadvantages and defence mechanisms. Additionally, for storage channels their RBR or PRBR are given. One group of steganographic techniques for IP uses fields from the IP header, that have some redundancy or normally are not used during the transmissions, such as Identification, Flags, Fragment Offset and Options in IPv4. The main drawback to all these channels is easy elimination by traffic normalizers, and main advantage is a big covert rate. Rowland [10] uses the 16-bits long Identification field from IPv4 header, in which he places the character's ASCII value multiplied by 256. If fragmentation occurs, the receiver will receive the same information for every new fragment of the datagram. One can use the redundancy in the IP's fragmentation strategy [37, 38] . An unfragmented datagram has all zero fragmentation information (More Fragment (MF ) = 0, Do Not Fragment (DF ) = 0, Fragment Offset=0). If communication parties know the MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) of their network, they can use the DF bit for sending 1-bit data per packet, or combination of DF bit and Identification field for sending 17-bit data per packet, by sending packets with sizes below the MTU. If communication parties do not know the MTU, they can send 8-bit per packet, by filling high 8 bits of the Identification field (the low 8 bits are generated randomly) with result of xoring of the first fixed 8-bits of the IP header and 8-bit data. Only condition is that the packet must not contain options in the IP header. Cauich et al [39] use the Identification and Fragment Offset fields for hiding messages. Their method provides 29 bits in every datagram that is not fragmented, but this can work only for two neighbouring nodes. First, they check if the receiving datagram has fragmentation (MF = 1). In the negative case, they use some of the three reserved bits in the header as an indicator whether the datagram carries a message or not, and then they put the data in the datagram's Identification and Fragment Offset fields.
Some of the steganographic techniques, as presented in Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski's paper [40] , also deploy the IP fragmentation process. The authors suggest:
• dividing the original IP packet into a predefined number of fragments (for example, even number will be binary 0, and odd number will be binary 1) -1 bit per packet is send;
• modulating the values that are inserted into Fragment Offset field (for example, even value will be binary 1, and odd value will be binary 0) -N F − 1 bits per packet are send, where N F is the number of fragments for that packet;
• using legitimate fragment with steganogram inserted into payload -N F · F S bits per packet are send, where N F is the number of fragments for that packet and the F S is the size of the fragment. It has a big covert rate and uses legitimate fragments, so it is harder to detect. Authors even suggested a method for the problem of differentiating the covert fragments by applying a hash function;
• using different rates for packet fragmentation (for example, one rate will be binary 1, and other will be binary 0) -2 bits per packet are send, where is the number of packets generation rates.
Covert channels can be created using fields in protocol's header that are changing during the transmission, like 1-bitper-packet noisy covert channel using Time To Live (TTL) field, suggested by Qu et al [41] . Zander et al [42] proposed an improved 1-bit-per-packet covert channel encoding in the TTL field, analysing initial TTL values and normal TTL occurring in networks. They suggest using two different starting values of TTL in packets, the typical initial value as High-TTL (binary 1) and High-TTL -1 as Low-TTL (binary 0). Servetto et al [48] introduces intentional losses in a numbered stream of packets for creating a covert channel using phantom packets. They skip one sequence number at the sender so no user data is lost. The loss that occurred during [40, 47] a fixed time interval is equal to sending one bit. The authors of [40, 47] use exactly the same technique for creating phantom fragments, by skipping one Fragment Offset value. For this to work correctly a modified receiver is needed. Ahsan and Kundur [37, 38] showed how to create a covert timing channel using packet sorting. If one sends packets and if the network guarantee proper sequencing for packet delivery, then by reordering the packets, one can send 2 ! bits. For this to be possible, a reference to relate sorted packet numbers to their actual natural order is needed. This can be found in a 32-bit Sequence number field of the Authentication Header (AH) and Option Data Length and Option Data fields used in IPSec. In [37] an algorithm for best sequence estimation in resorting, applicable in real networks which do not guarantee the order of delivered packets, is given. The authors of [40, 47] use exactly the same reordering technique but for sequence of fragments of a given packet, with obtained PRBR of 2 !, where is the number of fragments. Another reordering scheme, robust and resilient to external reordering effects and with built-in error detection/correction capabilities is given in [49] . By using only a subset of the permutations, the channel is equipped with error detection and correction capabilities, and is extremely robust and resilient to external reordering effects. PRBR is higher than 2 bits per packet. Galatenko et al [50] suggested a statistical covert channel through a PROXY server that transfers information by reordering packets so that destination addresses in a series of subsequent packets are ordered. IPv4 and IPv6 have mechanisms for discovering Path MTU (PMTU) -the smallest, acceptable MTU along the entire end-to-end path. They are PMTUD (Path MTU Discovery) for IPv4 and PLPMTUD (Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery) for IPv6. The first one use probe messages with DF flag set and ICMP for receiving notifications. The second one learns about PMTU by starting with packets of the relatively small size and when they get through, the progressively larger ones are send. Probe messages are validated at the transport layer, without help of the ICMP. One can utilize the probe messages in PMTUD (already knowing the MTU) to carry steganogram and invoke sending intentional fake ICMP messages by receiver [40, 47] . Covert probe messages can be distinguished by use of hash function, and fake ICMP messages can be distinguished by modifying TTL. RBR can be expressed as = =1 P /T bps, where denotes number of probes sent from sender to receiver, P probe payload size and T connection duration. The authors also suggest use of RSTEG (Retransmission Steganography) [88] for steganographic PLPMTUD, which uses intentional retransmissions to sent steganograms. Abad [44] demonstrated how a fundamental flaw in the design of the Internet checksum can allow a malicious user to embed covert channel data in the 16-bit Header checksum field itself using a hash collision. To obtain the hidden message, the receiver need to know and include the original TTL value before calculating the checksum. Padlipsky et al [51] suggested a covert timing channel in which the sender sends or does not send an IP packet in an arranged time interval. If a second is divided in N intervals, the RPR of this channel is N bps. Cabuk et al [52] implemented this idea. A client program listens on a given port for arriving of the first PDU. Additionally, the server sends not only data bits, but also synchronization and error-correcting bits. One advantage of this channel is that the packet loss does not affect the synchronization. A big disadvantage is creating an IPDs pattern if the same time interval is used. Berk et al [53] use the inter-packet delays (IPDs) of consecutive packets for encoding the covert information. In their system all the delays are stored and an average is calculated every time a new delay comes in. Every delay above the mean is decoded as binary one, and every delay below the mean is decoded as binary zero. For ex-filtrating the typed data, it is enough for the attacker to put some device between the keyboard and the victim computer (Keyboard JitterBug [54] ). In some applications (SSH, Telnet, etc) each keypress corresponds to a packet being sent out on the network, and by introducing small delays in keypresses, a passive covert timing channel can be created. In JitterBug, to encode a binary 0, the added delay is multiply of the timing window , and to encode binary 1, the added delay is multiply of [ 2 ] . Cabuk [55] presents improved timing channel based on replay attack, which uses saved real IPDs samples divided in two groups. Binary 1 is send by randomly replaying IPD from one group, and binary 0 by randomly replaying IPD from another group. Timing channels, suggested in [56] and [57] model and mimic the statistical properties of inter-packet delays of legitimate traffic, and they are computationally non-detectable if IPDs are independent identically distributed (iid). For example, this holds for real Telnet traffic [58] . Gianvecchio et al [56] offer a framework, with a filter, analyzer, encoder, and transmitter ( Figure 1 ). The filter profiles the real traffic, and the analyzer fits the real traffic behaviour to a model (Exponential, Pareto, Piosson, etc). Then, based on the model, the encoder chooses the appropriate distribution functions from statistical tools and traffic generation libraries to create covert timing channels, and finally, the transmitter generates covert traffic, blending it with real traffic. The channel from [57] uses intentional IPDs of consecutive packets for encoding L-bit binary strings in a sequence of packet inter-transmission times T 1 T 2 T , and masking the secret message with random numbers obtained by CSPRNG using one-time pad encryption technique. One disadvantages of the last two channels is that they require accessible sequence numbers in the legitimate traffic for synchronisation, which is usually available in TCP traffic, but not always in UDP traffic. Another timing channel with reduced robustness against network jitter as drawback is given in [59] . This channel has better synchronisation obtained from using a keyed hash function instead of CSPRNG for obtaining random numbers, and is stealthier because it encodes covert bits only into the least significant part of IPDs. In [45, 46] a novel covert channel is suggested based on the use of the "traceroute" command and IP header Record route options, which can have length up to 40B. Trabelsi and Jawhar [60] give a novel covert file transfer protocol (CFTP) based on the IP Record route option. The proposed protocol is based on a novel session-oriented mechanism that offers TCP-like features embedded inside the IP option field. Allix [32] gives the example of the following timing covert channel: let the attacker has the control of two machines A and B, each one having a connection to the same server C. If the machine A sends a packet and then the machine B sends two packets, this can be interpreted like a 0. If the machine A sends two packets and then the machine B sends one, this can be interpreted as 1. Allix suggests a counting covert channel also, with a chosen arbitrary number λ. During a connection if the number of transferred data is less than λ, this codes a binary zero, if the number of transferred data is greater or equal to λ, this codes a binary one. Graf [62] suggests using the IPv6 Destination Options header for hiding the message which is first TLV encoded. Lucena Servetto et al [48] 2001 Phantom packets
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Better synchronisation and stealthiness than [56] and [57] Reduced robustness against network jitter [40, 47] et al [63] analysed several covert storage channels in headers of IPv6 and for some of them, the sender must compute the ICV including the covert data. Manipulation of the IP header can be done in several ways:
• by setting false traffic in the 8-bit Traffic class,
• by setting false flow in the 20-bit Flow Label,
• by setting false source address in the 128-bit Source Address,
• by setting an initial Hop Limit value and manipulating the value of subsequent packets. A drawback of this channel is that packets do not necessarily travel the same route, so the number of intermediate hops may vary. By modifying packets, − 1 bits are send,
• by setting a valid value to add an extra extension header in the 8-bit Next Header field, or by increasing value of the Payload Length and append extra data at the end of the packet,
• by modification of the Option Data Length and Option Data fields in the the Hop-by-hop options header. For false router alert, PRBR is 2B, for false padding value PRBR is up to 256B, and for fabrication of one or more options, PRBR is up to 2038B,
• by 4-bytes Reserved field or by fabricating addresses up to 2048 bytes per packet in Routing header with routing Type 0
• by using 8-bit and 2-bit Reserved bits, setting false Next Header or inserting entire false fragment in the Fragment header. In the last case, authors propose two solutions to avoid this fragment to be included in the reassembly process: by inserting an invalid value in Identification field in Fragment header that causes fragment to be dropped, and by inserting overlapping Fragment Offset value that causes data to be overwritten during reassembly,
• by manipulating Option Data Length and Option Data fields with fabricating one or more options (PRBR up to 2038B) or setting false padding values (PRBR up to 256B) in the Destination options header,
• by using 2-bytes Reserved field or by creating an entire fake header up to 1022 bytes per packet in the Authentication header,
• by creating entire fake header up to 1022 bytes per packet or by setting false padding value up to 255 bytes per packet in the ESP header.
Some of these channels can fail in the ICV calculation, and trigger immediate detection, so communication parties need to be careful. The sender needs to calculate ICV after inserting covert data, and the receiver needs to intercept the packet before it reaches its destination. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is another connectionless protocol in the Internet layer, used to transfer error messages and other information between the nodes. ICMP messages are send encapsulated in IP packets. There are 14 (and 16 deprecated) different types of ICMP messages, which have common only first 4 bytes of the 8-byte ICMP header. The Loki project [64, 65] demonstrated a covert channel by putting arbitrary information tunnelling in the payload of ICMP Echo Request and ICMP Echo Reply packets. Additionally, the Loki client allows a remote attacker to wrap and transmit commands in ICMP payloads and the Loki server, unwraps and executes the commands, sending the results back wrapped in ICMP packets. This channel will work for any network device which does not filter the contents of ICMP Echo traffic, and is very simple to deploy. Other implementations of IP-over-ICMP tunnels are ICMPTX [69] , Skeeve [68] , ICMP-Chat [67] , etc. Their PRBR depends on the operating system and implementation, and can go up to 24B, 56B or more. In Skeeve, the hidden sender sends an ICMP Echo Request packet to the bounce server with an address of the receiver as a source IP. The bounce server can replay this packet and forward it to the receiver. ICMP-Chat is a simple console-based chat that uses ICMP packets for communication and AES for data encryption. It offers password protection with SHA-256 and the ability to change usage of ICMP codes within the application. These payload tunnels are further examined in [72] for resiliency with modern security approaches. The ping tunnel [70] allows to reliably tunnel TCP connections to a remote host using ICMP Echo Request and Echo Response packets. The tool V00d00n3t [71] can create covert channels using IPv6 and ICMPv6. It requires 4 digit PIN for the sender and receiver, allowing multiple streams. Ray and Mishra [73] demonstrate that it is possible to transmit large amounts of data covertly with a sophisticated support such as security and reliability, by using ICMP Echo Request packets. For hiding data in ICMP one can use the 32-bit reserved field in the ICMP Router Solicitation Message [38] . Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is a protocol for establishing multicast group memberships on IPv4 networks. The first covert channel for IGMP is suggested in [38] . Scott [74] suggests using the 8-bit and 16-bit Reserved fields in the IGMPv3 Membership Report, which are usually set to zeros and ignored by the receiver.
B0CK [43] is one implementation of IGMP/IPv4 covert channel, which uses the Source address field for hiding data. While B0CK packets have the IP Protocol field set to IGMP, they contain no encapsulated IGMP header; the packet is padded with 124 bytes of zeros after the 20-byte IP header. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is another protocol on the Internet layer, that enables a server to automatically assign an IP address to a computer from a defined range configured for a given network. Rios et al [75] suggested and implemented the following reliable covert channels in the tool HIDE_DHCP:
• by setting the 32-bit XID field, which is randomly generated by the client. This is stealthier, but with limited bandwidth,
• by using the SECS field, similarly like [76] , for transmitting one bit,
• by using the last 10B of the CHADDR field, when 48-bits Ethernet MAC address is used,
• 64-byte SNAME and 128-byte FILE fields consist of null-terminated strings, thus hidden data might be included after this character without negatively impacting other clients or servers. They are set to null by the operating system when they are not carrying their own data, but in some situations they might contain information belonging to the Options field, when option 52 (Overload) is included.
• by using variable-length Option Value field, and by the number of options used or the way options are ordered. The size of the resulting DHCP messages can be suspicious.
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
is a protocol for resolution of the IP address into a physical address such as an Ethernet address. Ji et al [77] suggest using the last 8 bits of the Target protocol address field for carrying the secret message.
Steganography in transport layer
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are two protocols that operates on Transport layer. TCP offers a reliable end-to-end connection-oriented service (see Table 5 for covert channel), and UDP offers a connectionless oriented service (see Table 6 for covert channel). Rowland [10] [76] presented a covert timing channel that uses TCP timestamps, by the modification of their low order bit. This method slows the TCP stream so that the timestamps on segments are valid when they are sent. 1-bit-per-segment covert channel can be obtained by comparing the low order bit of every TCP timestamp with the current message bit. If they match the segment is sent immediately with generated TCP timestamp, otherwise it is delayed for one timestamp tick and TCP timestamp is incremented. On slow network this channel is hard to detect because the low order bit of the timestamp appears randomly distributed. Chakinala et al [81] extend the reordering scheme proposed in [37, 38] and create a timing covert channel by reordering of TCP segments and using the Sequence Number field and suitably defined mathematical model. Luo et al [84] implemented storage covert channel Clack by modification of the Acknowledge Sequence Number field. Luo et al [85] implemented ACKLeaks covert channel which embeds covert messages into pure TCP ACK packets from single or multiple TCP connections, using the combinatorial approach. ACKLeaks can evade content-based detection methods and can be implemented by exploiting the existing TCP connections. Cloak [82] is a new class of reliable timing covert channels, which encodes a message by a unique distribution of N packets over X TCP flows with ten different encoding and decoding methods, and carefully crafted to mimic the normal TCP flows. Sender can establish HTTP session with a remote server which consists of several TCP flows, or with multiple servers. The warden could not detect Cloak simply based on the presence of multiple TCP flows to the same server, because it is not uncommon to have multiple TCP flows in an HTTP session. In the second case, the decoder should be located on the common routing path. TCP-Script [83] is another implementation of timing covert channel, which embeds the message in the normal TCP data bursts, and exploits TCP's feedback and reliability service to increase the decoding accuracy. The message is represented by an array of positive integers , where
and M is a constant pre-agreed by the encoder and decoder. Each is encoded by a burst of back-to-back TCP data segments, send in the encoding period T E . Two adjacent data bursts are separated by an appropriate time interval. This channel is robust against network jitter, packet loss and reordering, but has very low capacity and it is easy to differentiate its traffic from legitimate traffic. Mazurczyk et al [88, 89] apply RSTEG method to TCP by using all TCP retransmission mechanisms: RTO (Retransmission Timeout), FR/R (Fast Retransmit/Recovery) and SACK (Selective ACK). The main idea behind RSTEG is to not acknowledge a successfully received TCP segment in order to intentionally invoke retransmission. The retransmitted segment carries a steganogram instead of user data in the payload field. The intentional retransmissions due to RSTEG should be kept near normal network retransmission rate, to avoid detection. Authors use a hash function for marking covert segments. One limitation is the need of using normal network retransmission rates for harder detection. One covert channel in UDP can be created by presence or absence of the Checksum field in the datagram [86] , because 
Steganography in the application layer
Several protocols at the Application layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack can be used for creating covert channels, like HTTP, FTP, DNS, RTP, RTCP, SIP, SDP, etc.
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
Even most restrictive organizations usually allow the HTTP traffic. Dyatlov et al [97] suggest covert storage channels using header and/or body of the HTTP request/response. There is no limit from the Active warden and egress filtering [86] protocol itself in the size of the HTTP header or the body. But the size of all HTTP headers together depends on the platform -Apache servers accept headers with size up to 8KB, IIS up to 8KB or 16KB depending on the version. The Reverse WWW Shell tool [92] demonstrates how effective is HTTP in hidden messages delivery. In practice, the client slave application contacts the pre-configured master via an outgoing HTTP Request. The master application sends shell commands as HTTP Response packets, and the output from commands return from the slave as cgi script HTTP GETs. Bowyer [96] can be a binary zero. Headers come in no specified order, so it is possible to embed data in the ordering of the headers. Header names are case-insensitive, so using the different capitalisation of the header values can be used for covert channel. Alman [107] showed that due to a weakness in the CONNECT method in the HTTP protocol, arbitrary connection can be made through a HTTP proxy server and even a VPN can be established. Van Horenbeeck [102] implemented a tool Wondjina that creates a tunnel using the HTTP Entity tags (ETag and If-ŋNone-ŋMatch headers), which allows a client to verify whether its locally cached copy is still current. Even a Content-ŋMD5 header can be used for transferring up to 128 bits of data per HTTP message. Similar ideas are used in [104] , together with Access-Control-Allow-Origin and Content-Location header. Another approach involves modulating the least significant bits of the date-based fields such as Date and Last-Modified. Eßer and Freiling [99] suggest covert timing channel using HTTP, in which a web server sends covert data to a client by delaying a response (binary 1) or responding immediately (binary 0). Castro [103] suggest using cookies for creating covert channels in HTTP. Padgett [95] developed a tool Corkscrew for tunneling SSH over HTTP proxy, and LeBoutillier [100] implemented a tool HTTunnel for tunneling TCP or UDP over HTTP. Infranet [13] is a framework which uses covert channels in HTTP to circumvent censorship. Infranet's web servers receive covert requests for censured web pages encoded as a sequence of HTTP requests to harmless web pages and return their content hidden inside harmless images using steganography.
File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
Zou et al [108] suggested two covert channels into the FTP. The first one encodes covert bits directly into the FTP commands, so if there are N commands, every command will represent 2 N bits. The second one varies the number of FTP NOOP commands sent during idle periods. The number of sent NOOP commands is equal to the integer value of the covert data. Before sending a new value, an ABOR command needs to be sent. For FTP, it is normal to send NOOP or ABOR continually to prevent the control connections from entering the idle status. Domain Name System (DNS). DNS is very suitable for creating covert channels for tunnelling other protocols, for example IP, TCP or UDP over DNS. Specially interested are NS, CNAME and TXT records with length up to 255B, and experimental NULL record with length up to 65536B (300B-1200B in implementations). Two IPv4-over-DNS tools implemented in C, are Nameserver Transfer Protocol -NSTX [109] and Iodine [115] . Both split IP packets into several chunks, send them separately, then reassemble the IP packets at the other endpoint. For encoding data into queries, NSTX uses a non-compliant Base64 encoding, and replies are carried with TXT records. Iodine has support for a DNS extension EDNS0, which allows to use DNS packets longer than the initially chosen [106] 512-byte limit. For download traffic, Iodine uses NULL records (or TXT, SRV, MX, CNAME, A records), and upload traffic is gzziped and Base32 or non-compliant Base64 encoded in the Domain Name field from DNS Resource record. DNSCat [111] is a Java IPv4-over-DNS tool which uses CNAME records for download traffic. TUNS [110] is another IPv4-over-DNS tool (in Ruby), which doesn't split IP packets. It uses only CNAME records with Base32 encoding for sending data, which are frequently used in normal DNS traffic, so TUNS traffic is harder to filter. TUNS uses caching to resolve the problem with duplicated DNS queries and experiments showed that for perfect network conditions it is the slowest implementation, but in presence of packet loss, performs much better. OzymanDNS [112] and DNS2TCP [114] are two tools for tunnelling TCP or SSH over DNS, which use TXT records. Their main drawback is that they must provide a reliable communication channel over an unreliable protocol, and thus deal with losses, retransmissions, reordering and duplication of DNS packets. Covert timing channel for DNS, which uses DNS negative caching, i.e. caching NXDOMAIN answer for non-existent domains, is given in [113] . By querying a previously agreed set of subdomains of one non-existent domain, two hosts can covertly exchange messages, treating each cached subdomain as a binary one, and non-cached domain as binary zero. There is no need hosts to maintain or run a DNS server, and no need to know each other addresses. Another interesting area for deployment of covert channels are real-time applications over IP, as for example Voice Blocking by forbidding noncompliant names in queries [110] DNSCat [111] 2004 CNAME records storage up to 255B [110] TUNS [110] 2009 CNAME records storage up to 255B [110] over IP (VoIP), on-line multi-player games, streaming live A/V, etc. In these applications, usually audio and/or video is transmitted using separated streams by Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP), supported by its companion RTP Control Protocol (RTCP). One part of the RTP works in the Transport layer above UDP, and second in the Application layer. On the other hand, VoIP has signalling phase at the beginning (before audio transfer using RTP), which is carrying by some signalling protocol, like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). SIP usually is accompanied by some protocol for description of multimedia sessions, like Session Description Protocol (SDP). Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP). Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski [6] explained how to create covert channels in RTP, using 8-bits Padding field, variable-length Extension header, randomly generated initial values of the 16-bit Sequence Number and 32-bit Timestamp fields in the first RTP packet, or applying here Giffin et al [76] method with low order bit of Timestamp for creating one-bit-per-RTP packet covert channel ( Table 9 ). The last method can be used also in NTP Timestamp field in RTCP, but even more, up to 160 bits per packet covert channel can be obtain from report blocks in Receiver Report (RR) and Sender Report (SR) in RTCP. One can also use security mechanisms' fields in Secure RTP or in RTCP, like up to 80-bit authentication tag. In the same paper, authors suggest one method called LACK (Lost Audio Packets Steganographic Method) for creating covert channel, using intentionally delayed (and in consequence lost) packets payloads. The payload of the intentionally delayed packets is used to transmit secret information to receivers aware of the procedure. If the delay of such packets at the receiver is considered excessive, the packets are discarded by a receiver. Additionally, communication parties must consider the accepted level of packet loss for IP telephony and do not exceed it. First practical evaluation of this method is given in [118] . Other RTP payload based covert channels are not of our interests. Bai et al [116] used the 32-bit interarrival jitter field of the RTCP header for creating a covert channel. They used two phases: in the first phase, statistics of the value of the jitter field in the current network are calculated. In the second phase, the secret message is modulated into the interarrival jitter field according to the previously calculated parameters. Lizhi et al [117] suggest novel covert timing channel, which utilizes Run Length Code and Multi-Zero Code (to avoid frequently sending RTCP packets) to improve imperceptibility and robustness. The basic idea is very simple, if the current stegobit is the same as previous, an RTP packet is sent, otherwise an RTCP packet and an RTP packet are both sent. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP). Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski [119] suggest to use some tokens and fields in SIP for hiding data, like randomly generated tag in From field (which forms SIP dialog identifier), branch in Via field (which forms transaction identifier), Call-ID field (which uniquely identifies a call), first part of CSeq field (initial sequence number that serves as a way to identify and order transactions), Max-Forwards fields and several other fields. They also suggest to hide data in SDP in the fields v (version field ignored by SIP), o (owner/creator), s (session name -field ignored by SIP), t (time session is active -field ignored by SIP), and k (potential encryption key if the secure communication is used). Another covert channel exploits the fact that the order of headers in the SIP/SDP message depends on implementation, thus reordering of headers is possible as a mean to covertly send data. For example, Call-ID field after CSeq field is binary 1, and opposite is binary 0. Fields are not case sensitive, so one can create channel by using upcase for binary 1 and lowercase for binary 0. The authors of [119] suggest also creating covert channels in SIP and SDP using security mechanisms for providing authentication and confidentiality. SDP content embedded into the SIP INVITE message, may be encrypted and signed using S/MIME, and the secured parts of the message are divided from themselves using boundary randomly generated value, so this is the first possible covert channel. A second possibility is to use the signature bits inside the boundary values (application/pkcs7-signature) to transfer covert data. Secure Shell (SSH) is a cryptographic client-server protocol for secure data exchange, remote command execution, and other secure network services between two computers that connect via a secure channel over an insecure network. Lucena et al [120] suggest the MAC field for carrying messages up to 160 bits per SSH PDU. To simulate the randomness of the MAC, the embedded messages are previously compressed and then encrypted (Table 10 ). Another way is intermediate nodes to intercept the SSH traffic and inserts an additional encrypted message (up to 20B) at the beginning of the already encrypted payload. A 4 byte "magic" number at the beginning marks the presence of a hidden message. The hidden message can be carried in the Random padding field [34] also, with length up to 255B. 
Defence mechanisms
Covert channels need first to be identified or detected, before trying to defeat them. Identification tries to uncover a shared resource in the design phase, that can potentially be used as a covert channel variable, while detection tries to detect an actively running covert channel by examining its output events. There are several formal methods for identifying network covert channels: applying Shared Resource Matrix (SRM) method [121] in [122, 123] , Covert Flow Tree (CFT) method [124] , etc. Once identified or detected, the covert channel can be eliminated, limited, audited and/or documented [28] . Detecting covert timing channels is a challenging task and is usually based on some statistical tests for differentiating the covert from legitimate traffic. There are two basic classes of detection tests: shape test and regularity test. The first class uses first-order statistics (mean, variance, distribution), while the second class uses second or higher-order statistics. The regularity test is based on the fact that the variance of the legitimate IPDs changes over time, whereas for some timing channels the variance of the IPDs remains relatively constant. Peng et al [29] uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for detection of watermarked IPDs in [20, 21] . Cabuk et al [52] suggest the use of the -similarity test for detecting [51, 52] timing channel, which has a feature of creating clusters of similar IPDs at multiples of some time intervals. This and some other existing detection methods [53, 125] target only specific timing channels, or cannot perform well for high variation of network traffic. The authors of [59] using the auto-correlation test showed that [56, 57] timing channels are easy to detect with 80% accuracy and a false positive rate of 0.5%, when IPDs of legitimate traffic are not iid. Detection accuracy of the same test for [59] channel is reduced down to 9%. The most promising method for detecting covert timing channels based on IPDs is given in [61, 127] and is based on the observation that covert timing channels have effects on the entropy of the original process. The first order entropy (EN) is useful for comparing the shape of distributions of random variables, and the entropy rate estimated by minimum corrected conditional entropy (CCE) is useful for comparing the regularity of time series. Experiments showed that several timing channels can be detected, like: [51] channel (with abnormal shape and regularity), [52] (with similar shape and abnormal regularity), [56] (with similar shape and regularity as normal traffic) and [54] (with similar shape and regularity as normal traffic). Timestamp channels [76] and [75] with SECS field, can be detected by computing the ratio of the number of used different timestamps and total number of possible timestamps. For legitimate connection this ratio is close to 1, and for covert channel is around 0.5 [79] , because many timestamps are skipped. Detection of fragmentation methods given in [40, 47] can be performed by different statistical tests based on the number of fragments, fragment size, presence of unrelated fragments, and fragment rates. The best method [40, 47] for their elimination is to reassemble the original IP packet in the intermediate node responsible for detecting steganographic communication, then refragment it randomly and send to the receiver. Most of the covert storage channels can be eliminated effectively through protocol scrubbers [126] , traffic normalizers [129] and active wardens [86] . Protocol scrubbers and traffic normalizers are focused on eliminating ambiguities found in the traffic stream created by an attacker. Active wardens and traffic normalizers modify incoming and outgoing packets by setting unused, and reserved fields to zero, setting paddings to zero and removing extensions. They can be part of the end host or network devices. Using traffic normalization, header fields that are used sometimes, also can be set to zero or rewritten under some conditions. For example, TTL channels [41, 42] can be eliminated by an active warden which sets TTLs of all packets of a flow to the same value [42] . Lucena et al [63] suggest three types of active wardens: stateless, stateful, and network-aware, for IPv6 channels. Stateless active warden has no recollection of previous packets nor previously encountered semantic conditions. Stateful active warden can also register already-observed semantic conditions, and applies that knowledge in subsequent monitoring sessions. Network-aware active warden additionally has knowledge of the topology of the surrounding networks. Several covert channels can be eliminate by blocking protocols/ports by firewalls (Loki [64, 65] , ICMPTX [69] , Skeeve [68] , ICMP-Chat [67] ) or ingress/egress filtering (B0CK [43] , Skeeve [68] , false IPv6 Source Address [63] ). Another defence mechanisms against ICMP tunnelling are partially disabling ICMP traffic, limiting the size of ICMP packets, preserving ICMP packet for later investigation, and Singh et al [66] stateless model, which zeros out the entire payload of the ICMP packet. Covert−TCP [10] can be detected using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [128] , and together with NUSHU [78] by [9] anomaly tests, because covert headers are easily distinguished from those generated by a genuine TCP/IP stack. To fight RSTEG [88] , a passive warden with large memory can be used which monitor TCP traffic and store segments. On retransmissions, passive warden compares originally sent segment with retransmitted one and if the payload differs RSTEG is detected and the segment is dropped. To counter both UDP covert channels [86, 87] anomaly detection and/or egress filtering is needed [86] . By using behaviour profiles of traffic flows Pack et al [93] suggest the method for detecting HTTP tunnels. Their method contains the local level analysis module, which searches for local features of individual session packets; the session level analysis module, which examines the average activities for an entire session up to the current time; and the verification module, which extracts and considers the contents of packets to verify the existence of HTTP tunnel. Borders et al [94] tool Web Tap detects HTTP tunnels, by analysis of HTTP traffic over a training period, design of filters to help detect anomalies in outbound HTTP traffic, and using metrics such as request regularity, bandwidth usage, inter request delay time, and transaction size. Kwecka [105] implemented Inline Filtering Agent which detects its channel and channels created by modification of HTTP header names and order. [106] proposed a framework for sanitizing incoming and outgoing HTTP connections for tunnels, with a tool StegoProxy, which can be used for eliminating [104] channel also. Tunnels over DNS can be detected and/or eliminated by different techniques [110] . NSTX [109] and DNS2TCP [114] can be blocked by forbidding non-compliant names in queries. They, together with Iodine and OzymanDNS and be blocked by not serving queries for rarely used DNS records (TXT, NULL) or extensions (EDNS0). If filtering of CNAME records is not applicable, one can limit DNS covert channel by limiting the DNS bandwidth to several requests per second. SSH [120] MAC channel can be detected by wrong recomputed MAC value at the receiver end, and other [120] channel can be detected if sender do not care about packet length distribution in the normal SSH traffic. Several solutions are suggested for limiting the capacity of the covert channels, like: introduction of random noise for covert channel masking, insertion of dummy packets, delaying packets, use of fixed packet rates [130] , introduction of noise to all clocks [131] , etc.
